A guide for export-control officers, empowered officials and facility security officers who host visitors where ITAR technical data is present. It explains when a visit becomes an export under the ITAR and the EAR, how U.S.-person status is defined and recorded, what a Technology Control Plan and the NISPOM say about escorts, which records to keep, and where penalties and disclosure duties begin. Statements about SecurePoint are kept apart from the rules.
1.Executive summary
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR parts 120 to 130) control the export of defense articles, technical data and defense services. Releasing technical data to a foreign person in the United States is an export (22 CFR 120.50(a)(2)), and a visit is one way a release can happen: a visitor examines a defense article closely enough to learn its technical data, reads a drawing, or hears a technical discussion (22 CFR 120.56(a)).
The ITAR has no visitor rule. It does not say who may enter a building or who needs an escort. Those controls come from an organization’s Technology Control Plan (TCP), from the provisos on its licenses and agreements, and, for some cleared contractors, from the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). A visitor program is where those controls meet a person at the door, and where the record of the visit starts.
This paper covers when a visit becomes an export, how U.S.-person status is defined and recorded, what a TCP says about visitors, screening visitors against restricted-party lists, the records to keep, and where penalties and disclosure duties begin. Statements about SecurePoint appear in marked boxes and in section 6, apart from the rules.
2.When a visit becomes an export
Under the ITAR, an export includes releasing or otherwise transferring technical data to a foreign person in the United States, which the rule calls a deemed export (22 CFR 120.50(a)(2)). Section 120.56 says how a release happens:
Technical data is released through: (1) Visual or other inspection by foreign persons of a defense article that reveals technical data to a foreign person; (2) Oral or written exchanges with foreign persons of technical data in the United States or abroad; (3) The use of access information to cause or enable a foreign person, including yourself, to access, view, or possess unencrypted technical data; or (4) The use of access information to cause technical data outside of the United States to be in unencrypted form.
In a visit, the first two are the usual routes: a visitor examines hardware closely enough to learn how it is designed or made, reads a drawing on a wall or a screen, or hears a technical discussion. Presence in an area is not the test on its own. What the route exposes is, and judging that belongs to your export-control officer.
A release is deemed an export to every country where the foreign person holds or has held citizenship or holds permanent residency (22 CFR 120.50(b)), not only the country of the passport they show. A release to a national of a country listed in 22 CFR 126.1 is therefore an export to a country for which the policy of the United States is to deny licenses and other approvals (22 CFR 126.1(a)).
The EAR works differently
Dual-use items, and military items moved off the U.S. Munitions List, fall under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR, 15 CFR parts 730 to 774), which control technology and source code rather than technical data. Releasing them to a foreign person in the United States is also a deemed export (15 CFR 734.13(a)(2)), and a release happens through visual or other inspection or through oral or written exchanges (15 CFR 734.15(a)). The country the export counts toward is different, and so is the record period.
| Question | ITAR (22 CFR) | EAR (15 CFR) |
|---|---|---|
| What is controlled | Technical data for defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List | Technology and source code for items subject to the EAR |
| A release in the United States | An export to the foreign person (120.50(a)(2)) | A deemed export to the foreign person (734.13(a)(2)) |
| Which countries count | Every country of citizenship, past or present, and of current permanent residency (120.50(b)) | The most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency (734.13(b)) |
| How a release happens | Visual inspection, oral or written exchanges, or access information (120.56(a)) | Visual inspection, or oral or written exchanges (734.15(a)) |
| How long records are kept | Five years from the expiry of the license or other approval, or from the date of the transaction (122.5(a)) | Five years from the latest of the export, a known reexport or transfer, or the end of the transaction (762.6(a)) |
3.U.S. persons, foreign persons and dual nationals
For an individual, a U.S. person under the ITAR is a lawful permanent resident or a protected individual as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3): U.S. citizens and nationals, and certain others, such as people admitted as refugees or granted asylum (22 CFR 120.62). A foreign person is any natural person who is neither (22 CFR 120.63). Citizenship alone does not settle every case: a permanent resident or a refugee with no U.S. citizenship is a U.S. person.
Under the ITAR, a U.S. citizen is a U.S. person whatever other citizenship they hold. For a foreign person, the ITAR counts every country of citizenship or permanent residency, and the EAR only the most recent, so ask visitors before the visit for every citizenship, past and present, and any permanent residency.
Deciding a visitor’s status, and whether a release to them needs a license or an exemption, is the export-control officer’s job before the visit. Apply your facility policy without treating every ordinary visit as an export.
4.Technology Control Plans and escorts
The ITAR sets no escort rule. Escort requirements come from your Technology Control Plan (TCP), from the provisos on your licenses and agreements, and, for some cleared contractors, from the NISPOM, which requires a TCP of those under a foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI) mitigation or negation agreement and of others when the cognizant security agency (CSA) decides one is appropriate:
A TCP approved by the CSA will be developed and implemented by those entities cleared under a VT, PA, SSA and SCA and when otherwise deemed appropriate by the CSA. The TCP will prescribe all security measures determined necessary to reasonably prevent the possibility of access by non-U.S. citizen employees and visitors to information for which they are not authorized.
VT, PA, SSA and SCA are a voting trust, a proxy agreement, a special security agreement and a security control agreement, the FOCI mitigation and negation agreements the paragraph names. The same paragraph says a TCP includes unique badging, escorts, segregated work areas and security indoctrination, as appropriate. The NISPOM speaks of non-U.S. citizens, a wider group than the ITAR’s foreign persons because it includes permanent residents, so a TCP that serves both should say which test each control uses.
Outside those cases a TCP is a document an organization writes for its own program. Whatever its source, it describes the physical and procedural safeguards for controlled areas and data: which areas hold technical data, who may enter each, when a visitor needs an escort, and how staff keep technical data out of sight along an approved route.
What a visitor system can and cannot enforce
A visitor system can refuse to admit or badge a visitor until the conditions your TCP sets at the door are met, and record that they were. It cannot see what a visitor sees after the door. Staff, escorts and physical access controls keep a visitor on the approved route, and a badge or a cleared screening does not authorize an export.
5.Screening visitors against restricted-party lists
No ITAR provision requires screening visitors, but several rules make it prudent. Without DDTC’s written authorization, no one who knows a person is ineligible, a group that includes debarred persons, may take part in a transaction subject to the ITAR from which that person may benefit (22 CFR 127.1(d) and 120.16(c)). OFAC’s sanctions bar U.S. persons from dealing with blocked persons, and the EAR restricts exports and releases of technology to parties on the Entity List and the Denied Persons List.
Screen every visitor, U.S. persons included: the lists name U.S. citizens and companies as well as foreign ones. Screen before arrival where you can, again at check-in, and on a schedule for visitors who return. A name match only nominates a candidate; the dates of birth, nationality and other identifiers on the list entry decide it, and a person should make that call.
Screening is not a national-origin rule
Export controls restrict releases of technology according to a person’s status, not visits according to national origin. Where a visit is part of hiring, such as an interview, anti-discrimination law also applies: 8 U.S.C. 1324b and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act bar discrimination by national origin, and 8 U.S.C. 1324b bars discrimination by citizenship status against protected individuals unless a law, regulation, executive order or government contract requires it. Apply the same screening to every visitor, and tie escorts and holds to an export-control reason.
6.How SecurePoint handles a visit at an ITAR site
| Control | SecurePoint enforces | SecurePoint records | Your organization decides |
|---|---|---|---|
| Host | No check-in without a named host, chosen from the directory or typed in | The host on the visit | Which hosts may receive controlled visits |
| Identity | An ID captured at check-in; one uploaded at pre-registration does not count. A name or document number that differs from the pre-registration holds the visit for review. | The ID image and the comparison | What identity proof your TCP requires |
| U.S.-person status | An attestation or foreign-national acknowledgment at every check-in, and the compliance holds in section 3 | The answer, the country given and any reviewer’s decision | Status under 22 CFR 120.62 and 120.63, and any other citizenship |
| Screening | Screening at pre-registration and again at check-in; no badge while a possible match is under review | The result, the reviewer, the decision and its reason | Each possible match, and whether to turn on the DDTC list |
| NDA | A signed NDA before the visitor is admitted | The signed NDA and the version the visitor saw | The NDA’s terms |
| Escort | An escort named before Admit or a badge for anyone who needs one, with no override | Escort assignment, the host’s escort confirmation and the end of the escort, with timestamps | Escorting the visitor along the approved route |
| Areas | Nothing inside the facility: SecurePoint does not track movement or connect to door hardware | No movement inside the facility | The approved route and the physical controls that enforce it |
| After the visit | An after-visit report for every foreign national’s visit, which cannot be switched off | The host’s answers: whether controlled technology was shared, a description, and the ECCN if known; a yes sends an alert | Assessing any release and whether to disclose it |
| Audit trail | Application users cannot edit or delete entries | Each step in an append-only, hash-chained audit log with a verifier that checks the chain, kept for ten years | Your own records under 22 CFR 122.5 |
| Line | What it prints |
|---|---|
| Banner | ITAR RESTRICTED AREA, or DCSA HIGH SECURITY |
| Screening | SCREENED and the check-in date once screening has cleared, otherwise SCREENING: REVIEW |
| Escort | ESCORT: REQUIRED, unless the visitor is a confirmed U.S. person and no other escort rule applies |
| Status | US PERSON for a confirmed U.S. person, ESCORTED FOREIGN NATIONAL for a foreign national, and VERIFY ACCESS otherwise |
| Zone | ZONE: ESCORT ONLY, unless the visitor is a confirmed U.S. person; then ZONE: ITAR AREA or ZONE: HIGH SECURITY |
| Host | HOST: and the host’s name |
7.Records and retention
Every person required to register with DDTC must keep records of the manufacture, acquisition and disposition of defense articles and technical data, of defense services and brokering, and of related political contributions, fees and commissions, including the documentation for exports made under licenses or exemptions (22 CFR 122.5(a)). A record may not be altered without recording the change, who made it and when.
All records subject to this section must be maintained for a period of five years from the expiration of the license or other approval, to include exports using an exemption (see § 123.26 of this subchapter); or, from the date of the transaction (e.g., expired licenses or other approvals relevant to the export transaction using an exemption).
This is not a rule to keep every foreign visitor’s ID image or movement log. Have counsel decide which visit records support a covered activity and when their five years start. Under the EAR, records run five years from the latest of the export, a known reexport or transfer, or the end of the transaction (15 CFR 762.6), and OFAC requires ten years for records of transactions subject to its regulations (31 CFR 501.601).
8.Penalties, disclosure and DDTC enforcement
Civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act do not require intent. The maximum for each violation is the greater of $1,271,078 or twice the value of the transaction (22 CFR 127.10(a)(1)(i)), the figure set in January 2025; OMB Memorandum M-26-11 cancelled the 2026 inflation adjustment. Willful violations are crimes, with a fine of up to $1,000,000, up to 20 years in prison, or both, for each violation (22 U.S.C. 2778(c)).
Disclosure
The State Department strongly encourages voluntary disclosure of a possible violation to DDTC and may consider it a mitigating factor (22 CFR 127.12(a)); failing to report one will be an adverse factor. A disclosure starts with an initial notification immediately after a violation is discovered, and if that notification is incomplete, a full disclosure must follow within 60 calendar days (127.12(c)(1)). A disclosed violation can still be penalized (127.12(b)(3)).
One notice is not voluntary. Anyone who knows or has reason to know of a proposed or actual export of defense articles, defense services or technical data to a country listed in § 126.1, or to a person acting on its behalf, must inform DDTC immediately (22 CFR 126.1(e)(2)). Because a release is an export to every country where the recipient holds or has held citizenship or holds permanent residency, a release during a visit by a national of a § 126.1 country can bring this duty into play. Counsel should decide.
DDTC consent agreements
DDTC publishes its consent agreements. The six below involve technical data reaching foreign persons or foreign destinations, and the figures are the civil penalties the State Department announced.
| Case | Civil penalty | What the State Department described |
|---|---|---|
| GE Aerospace (April 2026) | $36 million, $18 million suspended for remedial compliance | 116 alleged violations, all voluntarily disclosed, including unauthorized exports of technical data to China. An external Special Compliance Officer and at least one external audit. |
| BAE Systems, Inc. (August 2026) | $36 million, $18 million suspended for remedial compliance | 104 alleged violations, all but one voluntarily disclosed, including unauthorized exports of technical data. An external Special Compliance Officer and at least one external audit. |
| The Boeing Company (February 2024) | $51 million, $24 million suspended for remedial compliance | 199 alleged violations, all voluntarily disclosed, including unauthorized exports and retransfers of technical data to foreign-person employees and contractors, and unauthorized exports of technical data to China. |
| FLIR Systems (April 2018) | $30 million, $15 million suspended | Alleged unauthorized exports of technical data and defense services, including to dual-national employees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Cuba who could reach technical data in company systems. DDTC said the company did not collect the citizenship information it needed to determine licensing requirements. |
| Honeywell International (April 2021) | $13 million, $5 million suspended | 34 alleged violations, voluntarily disclosed, involving engineering drawings with technical data for parts of the F-35, F-22 and B-1B aircraft and the CTS800 engine, exported to destinations including China. |
| L3Harris Technologies (September 2019) | $13 million, $6.5 million suspended | 131 alleged violations, including unauthorized exports of technical data, some in software, and of tactical radios and military electronics, license-proviso violations and a false statement. Harris disclosed most of them voluntarily; the State Department found the others. |
Voluntary disclosure did not remove the penalties: GE Aerospace and Boeing disclosed every violation, and BAE Systems all but one, and each agreed to an external Special Compliance Officer.
9.An implementation plan
The steps below set the order of the work. How long each takes depends on the number of sites, the controlled areas in each and your security review, and a signed project plan sets the dates.
Scope the program
Identify the sites and areas that hold technical data, the U.S. Munitions List categories and export classifications involved, and the visits that could expose them. Confirm whether the NISPOM or a license proviso requires a TCP for any site, and who decides U.S.-person status, export classification and disclosure.
Write the visitor rules into the TCP
Who needs a host, an escort, an NDA or an ID check; what a visitor may see along the approved route; how escorts hand over; and what happens when a visitor’s status is unresolved.
Configure the visitor system
Set each controlled site’s rules, the lists you screen against, the review threshold and re-screening interval, and the badge each site prints. Document how escorts and physical access controls enforce the boundaries a visitor system cannot see.
Test with visits of each kind
Run test visits for a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident, a foreign national from a country outside § 126.1, a national of a § 126.1 country, and a visitor who matches a list. Check each visit’s record, badge and evidence export.
Train, then go live
Train the front desk, hosts and escorts on their part, and reviewers on match and status decisions. Run the new process alongside the old one at first, and have counsel review the first evidence export against your records program.
Frequently asked questions
- Does SecurePoint make our organization ITAR compliant?
- No. ITAR compliance is a program your organization runs, and the obligation stays with you. SecurePoint is one control inside that program: it screens visitors, takes a U.S.-person attestation at check-in at controlled sites, holds visits that need a decision, keeps a visitor who needs an escort from being admitted or badged until one is named, and keeps the record.
- What is a deemed export in a visitor context?
- Releasing ITAR technical data, or EAR-controlled technology or source code, to a foreign person in the United States is an export (22 CFR 120.50(a)(2) and 15 CFR 734.13(a)(2)). A visit can cause one when a visitor sees or hears controlled information. Whether a release needs authorization is a decision for your export-control officer or counsel, not one a screening tool makes.
- Can a visitor management system replace a Technology Control Plan?
- No. A Technology Control Plan is the program document that sets your rules. A visitor system is one of the controls that applies those rules at the door and records that they were applied. Escorts and physical access controls do the rest, and the plan stays yours to write, maintain and defend.
- What does SecurePoint record for a visit to a controlled site?
- The visitor and host, the purpose, the site, the U.S.-person attestation or foreign-national acknowledgment, the screening result and any review decision with the reviewer, the escort and the host’s escort confirmation, the NDA, badge printing, check-out, and the after-visit report where one is due. Those records are written to an append-only, hash-chained audit log and can be exported as an evidence pack.
- Does screening tell us whether a visitor needs an export license?
- No. Screening tells you whether a party may match a restricted-party list and routes possible matches to a documented human review. Whether a release needs a license depends on the technology, its classification, the visitor’s countries and the end use, and belongs with your export-control officer or trade counsel.
Sources and revision history
First published March 2026. Last reviewed against the sources below and against SecurePoint's product as it stood that day. The sources are listed for traceability, not as endorsements. Confirm current text with the issuing agency before relying on a citation.
- [1]International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR parts 120 to 130)
Export and deemed export (§ 120.50), release (§ 120.56), U.S. person and foreign person (§§ 120.62 and 120.63), ineligible and debarred persons (§§ 120.16(c) and 127.1(d)), and registrants’ records (§ 122.5).
- [2]22 CFR § 126.1: Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from certain countries
The countries subject to a policy of denial, and the duty in § 126.1(e)(2) to inform DDTC immediately of a proposed or actual export to one of them. Syria was removed from § 126.1(d)(1) effective October 1, 2026 (91 FR 62313).
- [3]22 CFR § 127.12: Voluntary disclosures
A disclosure may be a mitigating factor (§ 127.12(a)); after an incomplete initial notification, a full disclosure is due within 60 calendar days (§ 127.12(c)(1)).
- [4]22 CFR § 127.10: Civil penalty
Civil maximum per violation of 22 U.S.C. 2778: the greater of $1,271,078 or twice the value of the transaction, as adjusted for inflation at 90 FR 1868 (January 10, 2025).
- [5]OMB Memorandum M-26-11 (April 17, 2026)
Cancelled the 2026 civil penalty inflation adjustments; agencies keep their 2025 amounts. The copy linked is the one the Federal Election Commission publishes.
- [6]22 U.S.C. 2778(c): Criminal violations
Willful violations: a fine of up to $1,000,000, up to 20 years in prison, or both, per violation.
- [7]15 CFR § 734.13: Export (Export Administration Regulations)
A release of technology or source code to a foreign person in the United States is a deemed export to the person’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency (§ 734.13(b)). Release is defined in § 734.15.
- [8]15 CFR § 762.6: Period of retention
EAR records run five years from the latest of the export, a known reexport or transfer, or the end of the transaction.
- [9]32 CFR § 117.11: Foreign ownership, control, or influence (NISPOM)
Paragraph (h)(1) requires a Technology Control Plan of contractors cleared under a voting trust, proxy agreement, special security agreement or security control agreement, and of others when the cognizant security agency decides one is appropriate.
- [10]8 U.S.C. 1324b: Unfair immigration-related employment practices
Defines the protected individuals the ITAR counts as U.S. persons (§ 1324b(a)(3)), and bars national-origin and citizenship-status discrimination in hiring, recruitment or referral for a fee, and discharge.
- [11]U.S. Department of State: GE Aerospace settlement (April 2026)
$36 million consent agreement, $18 million suspended, resolving 116 voluntarily disclosed alleged violations, including unauthorized exports of technical data to China.
- [12]U.S. Department of State: BAE Systems, Inc. settlement (August 2026)
$36 million consent agreement, $18 million suspended, resolving 104 alleged violations, all but one voluntarily disclosed.
- [13]U.S. Department of State: The Boeing Company settlement (February 2024)
$51 million consent agreement, $24 million suspended, resolving 199 voluntarily disclosed alleged violations, including unauthorized exports of technical data to foreign-person employees and contractors and to China.
- [14]U.S. Department of State: FLIR Systems, Inc. settlement (April 2018)
$30 million consent agreement, $15 million suspended, including unauthorized exports and retransfers of technical data to dual-national employees from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Cuba.
- [15]U.S. Department of State: L3Harris Technologies, Inc. settlement (September 2019)
$13 million consent agreement, $6.5 million suspended, resolving 131 alleged violations, most voluntarily disclosed.
- [16]U.S. Department of State: Honeywell International, Inc. settlement (announced May 2021)
$13 million consent agreement signed in April 2021, $5 million suspended, resolving 34 voluntarily disclosed alleged violations involving engineering drawings with technical data.
- [17]DDTC Penalties and Oversight Agreements
DDTC’s index of consent agreements and charging letters.
Revision history
Rewritten so the web page and the PDF carry the same text. Added how the EAR counts a visitor’s countries differently from the ITAR, when the NISPOM requires a Technology Control Plan, the § 126.1(e)(2) notice and the timing of a voluntary disclosure, a note on anti-discrimination law, and the badge lines SecurePoint prints at a controlled site. Replaced the workflow phases with a table of what SecurePoint enforces, what it records and what stays with your organization, and removed statements the product does not support: an authorized escort roster, escort data in the after-visit report, logged badge return and deactivation, monitoring of where visitors go, a separation of duties the roles do not enforce, and an implementation timeline nobody had measured. The subtitle no longer says visitor screening meets ITAR requirements.
Clarified the scope and trigger of ITAR record retention, left U.S.-person status and license or exemption determinations with the export-control officer or counsel, and distinguished visitor-workflow support from physical TCP enforcement. Removed claims that a visitor's export classification decides their zones, that each zone sets badge permissions, that badges reflect an approved access posture, and that customers configure site zones in SecurePoint; described the zone line SecurePoint badges print; and directed country-policy review to the current rule.
Updated the ITAR § 126.1 country examples (Syria came off the list on October 1, 2026; China, Venezuela, and Burma are now named) and added the 2024 and 2026 DDTC consent agreements with Boeing, GE Aerospace, and BAE Systems. Corrected the citations for escorts, zone separation, and records, where SecurePoint captures U.S.-person status, and when check-in screens a visitor again.
Corrected ITAR citations and penalty figures, and removed a claim that SecurePoint enforces zone boundaries.
Described the DDTC debarred list as off until an administrator enables it, and removed an unmeasured deployment-time figure.
This whitepaper is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, regulatory, export-control, or compliance advice.
It is not a substitute for review by qualified counsel, or by the compliance, security, export-control or assessment professionals familiar with your organization, its contracts, facilities and obligations.
Regulatory citations, enforcement examples, and statistics reflect publicly available information believed to be accurate as of the "Last reviewed" date on the cover page. Regulations and enforcement priorities change; consult primary sources before acting on anything in this document.
Statements about SecurePoint USA capabilities describe product behavior as of the "Last reviewed" date, not a contractual commitment. Capability fit for any specific environment must be confirmed during scoping.
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